We characterize the equilibrium exchange rate in a general equilibrium economy without imposing strong restrictions on the output processes, preferences, or commodity market imperfections.
The popular case of risk-neutrality and homothetic preferences has rather exceptional implications. First, under these assumptions relative PPP holds irrespective of commodity market imperfections and differences in consumption preferences. Second, initial wealth does not affect the equilibrium if (and only i~the assumptions of perfect goods markets and identical preferences are added.
In another special case-with homothetic, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions-we obtain a tractable and testable generalization of the traditional PPP equation.
Specifically, according to the CRRA model there are two missing variables in the PPP equation (the two countries' nominal spending); moreover, the elasticities of the exchange rate with respect to the price indices need not be identical across countries, and their sign differs from what PPP predicts.
In a (more realistic) model with non-homothetic preferences, the nominal exchange rate change depends not only on the standard ("average") inflation differential across countries (as in the PPP model) but also on the inflation differential computed on the basis of marginal consumption weights, growth in real spending, and the (generally time-v~ing) degree of risk aversion in the two countries.
From items (b) and (d), we infer that standard regression or cointegration tests of PPP suffer from missing-variables biases and ignore variations in risk aversions across countries and over time. In hyperinflation samples, relative PPP may seem to hold fairly well because the missing variables then behave quite similarly and because the elasticities of the exchange rate with respect to all variables sum to unity,
We complement our theoretical analysis of the exchange rate with empirical test of a version of the model with constant relative risk aversion and homothetic preferences, using the Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration framework. We find, first, that the outcome of the tests crucially depends on whether (and how) nominal spending is allowed to enter into the short-term dynamics of the exchange rate: If nominal spending is entirely absent from the short-term dynamics, or when only real spending is included in the vector autoregessions (VARS), we reject both PPP and the CRRA model. Second, when nominal spending is given an independent role (next to prices) in the short-term dynamics, both PPP and the CRRA model become acceptable.
We provide a theoretical explanation for the inability to distinguish between the PPP and CRRA models in samples where nominal spending and price data have sirnil~time paths.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present a generalized version of the Stockman (1980) equilibrium model, In Section II, we analyze deviations from Absolute PPP under homothetic utility-first for the general case, and then for the special cases of risk neutrality and constant relative risk aversion. We also discuss the implications of the CRRA model for cointegration tests of exchange rate models. In Section III, we test this special version of the model. As mentioned before, the results are ambiguous, In Section IV, we therefore return to theory, We derive a general model for changes in the exchange rate and we use this model to reinterpret regression tests of relative PPP and cointegration tests of the CRRA model, Section V concludes, A glossa~summarizing the mathematical notation used in the paper is included at the end of Section V.
I. The Economy and the Equilibrium Exchange Rate
In this section, we first describe a model of a multi-country, multi-good economy with imperfect commodity markets. We impose only a few (very standard) restrictions on preferences, and none on production or endowment processes or on the degree or type of commodity market imperfections. In the second part of this section, we chmacterize the exchange rate in this general setting.
The economy that we consider consists of M 22 countries. We focus on two arbitrarily selected countries that are referred to as the home country (subscript k = 1) and the foreign country (k= 2). Each country has a representative consumer with a standard, strictly quasi-concave utility function defined over N 21 goods. Across countries these representative individuals may differ in terms of risk-aversion, consumption preferences, and initial wealths.
The outputs of each of the N goods can be stochastic over time. The economies could be exchange economies where output is given by exogenous endowment processes (as in Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982) ) or production economies with endogenous investment decisions (as in Dumas (1992) and Stulz (1987) ). The specification of the production or endowment processes is quite general: some goods may be produced everywhere, while other goods maybe produced only in some countries. International shipment of these goods may be costly for some or even all of these goods ; these costs are assumed to be purely variable costs (as in Dumas ( 1992) and Sercu et al. (1995) ). Given these costs for transferring goods across countries, some goods may be traded all the time, some may be tradable in the strict sense (that is, traded only if the price difference is sufficient] y large to justify incurring the shipment costs), and some goods may be de facto nontradable.z For simplicity, money is introduced into the model via the Lucas (1982) cash-in-advance constraint.3
We assume that financial markets are complete and perfect. Thus, the outcome of decentralized consumption and investment decisions is identical to the solution of a central 20ther frictions could be introduced, like shipment lags (goods sent from one country at time t arrive only at time t+]) and transaction lags (a trade arranged at time t is implemented at time t+ 1 only). It can be shown that neither transaction lags nor shipment lags affect any of our conclusions. 3Essentia11y the same results would be obtained if real money balances were introduced as an argument in the utility function, except that the price index will contain the interest cost of money balances-see, for instance, Stulz (1987 This optimization is constrained by an opportunity set that depends on (1.1) the currently available outputs, the production functions, and the shipping technology. We do not need to specify the opportunity set explicitly. In (1.1),~(t) is the vector of consumption quantities Ckj(t) of good j (=1, . . .. N) consumed by the representative individual in country k (= 1, . . .. M) and Uk is the utility function of the representative investor in country k. The relative weight assigned by the central planner to each of the other countries, ek, generally is a function the initial distribution of wealth in the equivalent decentralized problem.d In turn, these initial wealths depend on the initial endowments, the characteristics of the (stochastic) investment functions or endowment processes, the frictions in the international markets for consumption and capital goods, and the utility functions.s For example, one sufficient (but not necessary) set of assumptions to obtain gk = 1 is when the utility functions, the initial endowments, and the parameters of the output process of all countries are identical.
Given the above assumptions, we now derive the exchange rate. Define the net endowment of each good in each country as the amount available for consumption. In an exchange economy, the net endowments are, of course, identical to the gross endowments, while in a production economy we need to set aside the resources needed for the optimal investments identified from the 41n a decentralized economy with a complete capital market, there exists a portfolio strategy that allows investors to implement the central planner's solution. For example, consider the case where t3~= 1, utility functions are equal, and shipmen[ costs are zero. The central planner's solution then is to give each of the M countries an equal amount of consumption, The portfolio strategy that implements this plan is that each country holds 1~-th of the shares of each productive asset, so that each country can obtain 1~-th of world output. 5When commodity preferences are not equal, t32 obviously depends also on the (arbitrarily chosen) size of the reference bundle in which each country's real wealth is expressed. solution of ( 1.1). If ( 1.1) is maximized, it must be impossible to further increase the utility from current consumption in one country without reducing either consumption in another country or investments. Denote the aggregate utility of the central planner from immediate consumption by (boldface) U(.): M U(q(t)) = ul(Ql(t)) +~.2ek uk(a(t)).
( 1.2) Thus, in the optimum identified from ( 1.1), U(q(t)) must be at its maximum subject to the feasible set implied by the net endowments and the transaction technology. From this Pareto-optimality of consumption, it follows that the relative price for any pair of goods can be read off as the marginal rate of substitution (MRS), along U(~(t)), in the optimum.
Let us chose, as the pair of goods, one unit of good j located in country 1 and one unit of the same good j located in coun~2. The local-currency prices of these goods are denoted by plj(t) and pzj(t). Because the relative price has to be computed from nominal prices expressed in a common numeraire, we need a reference numeraire and an exchange rate. Without loss of generality, we select currency 1 as the numeraire, and use the symbol S(t) to denote the exchange rate (units of country-1 currency per unit of currency 2). Below, the relative price to the MRS:
we write the condition that equates (1.3)
In Proposition 1, below, we now link the nominal exchange rate to the marginal indirect utility function.6 The indirect utility function, V(Mk(t), Pk(t)), is defined as
where Mk(t) is the amount of nominal spending, expressed in units of currency k. The marginal 6Proposition 1 is a familiar result in the Unbiased Expectations literature; see, for instance, Lewis (1995) .
indirect utility of nominal spending in country k is the multiplier, A(t), in the above optimization problem:
Proposition 1: The nominal exchange rate, S(t), is proportional to the ratio of the marginal indirect utility of total nominal spending in the two countries:
3) to relate the central planner's MRS to the marginal utilities of the two countries:
Then solve for the exchange rate:~U
To obtain (1.5), we substitute dUk(t)/dckj(t) = Ak(t) pjk(t), which is the first-order condition obtained from the optimization problem defined in (1.4). +
We wish to study the implications of Proposition 1 for the real exchange rate and deviations from PPP. In Section II, the focus is on the level of the exchange rate. Most of this discussion is confined to the special case of homothetic utility functions. h this section we obtain a new sufficient condition for PPP, and a testable generalized equation that contains PPP as a special case. We test this model in Section III. In the non-homothetic preferences case, it is rarely possible to obtain a tractable characterization of the level of the exchange rate from ( 1.5); however, as shown in Section IV, an interesting general characterization of changes in exchange rates is always possible,
II. Characterizing the tivel of the Exchange Rate
In this section, we consider the special case of homothetic preferences. We first discuss the general implications of homothetic preferences for the exchange rate equation (1.5). We then consider two alternative special cases that both imply PPP, artd we derive the CRRA exchange rate model of which PPP is a special case. Lastly, we discuss the implications of our theoretical results for empirical tests of PPP.
11.A Implications of the Assumption of Homothetic Utility Functions
By definition, a homothetic utility function can be written as uk(~(t)) = @[Uk(Qk(t))], where Uk(Qk(t)) is linear homogeneous in the consumption quantities and where @k is a positive transformation. The function LIk(Lk(t)) can be thought of as summarizing the consumption preferences (which are independent of wealth or total spending), while the curvature of the transformation, @(.), reflects the degree of risk aversion, This separation of consumption preferences from risk aversion makes it possible to obtain simple statements about the level of the exchange rate in terms of the level of nominal spending, the level price and relative risk aversion.v
If the function @[uk(~k(t))] is at its maximum value given a consumption budget constraint, then Uk(Qk(t)) must also be at its maximum value subject to the same Constraint. It iS well known (see, for instance, Samuelson and Swamy (1974) ) that the solution of the linearhomogenous problem,
7With non-homothetic utility, similar results can be obtained only in very special cases. One example of ã ' l-n, where risk aversion is a constant (q) tractable non-homothetic function is u(t) = [Hjfll (Cj (t) -mj ) J ] and the optimal consumption pattern depends on total spending and prices in a very straightforward way, iS Of the fO~Vk(t) = Mk(t)~k(pk(t)). The fUnCtiOn~k(~k(t)) is independent Of nOfind spending, Mk(t), and is linear homogeneous in the prices. Accordingly,~k(W(t)) is interpreted as the price level, and vk(t) = Mk(t)/~k(~(t)) is interpreted as real spending. These properties of homothetic fictions lead to the following restit:
Proposition 2: If utility functions are homothetic, the nominal exchange rate, S(t), and the real exchange rate, Wt), are given by
Proof Using the relations Vk[Mk(t),~(t)] =~(vk(t)) and vk(t) = Mk(t)/TIk(t), we can specify the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending as follows:
tends to be higher when (3zis higher. The optimum is jointly determined by the indifference curves and the opportunity set. First consider the effect of initial wealths on the central planner's indifference curves. A higher initial wealth for country 2 generally implies a higher value for ez,s which means that, in the (v2, VI) plane, the indifference curves are more to the right, reflecting the bias in favor of country-2 consumption. For instance, in Figure 1 the curve through V' corresponds to a higher value of 82 than is the case for the cume through V. Thus, for given endowments a higher initial wealth for country 2 will produce a higher MRS provided that the opportunity set is convex. We now show that the opportunity set is convex if (a) there are transaction costs or (b) consumption preferences differ across countries.
(a) The graph on the left in Figure 1 illustrates the case of one good and a proportional transaction cost equal to~, as in Dumas (1992) . The bound on the consumption opportunity set is piece-wise linear: its slope is <1 +~) when country 2 is importing (that is, when the consumption point V = (v2, VI) is to the right and below the net endowment point Q = (qz, ql)), and its slope is -1/(1+~) when county 2 is exporting. Thus, the opportunity set is convex, and equilibria more to the right (like V' relative to V) correspond to a higher MRS and, therefore, a higher real exchange rate.
(b) The graph on the right illustrates the case of many commodities, no frictions, and different consumption preferences, Uk(gk(t)). The problem of deriving the opportunity set for international real spending, (v1, v2), is isomorphic to the problem of deriving a country's production opportunity set in the Heckscher-Ohlin model: the role of the Heckscher-Ohlin linear homogeneous production functions with different factor intensities is taken over by the linear homogeneous preference functions uk(~) with different consumption preferences; and the role of the factor endowments is taken over by the aggregate endowments,~= qlj + q2j, for each of the goods.
Thus, with different consumption preferences the opportunity set is strictly convex. Therefore, the solution for a higher value of ez, V', again results in a higher MRS than the solution for lower (32, ' The one exception is discussed in Proposition 3(c).
v. #
The second corollary fits in with the stylized fact that currencies of richer countries tend to have higher real values. Thus, the effect of relative wealth (via 92) complements the Balmsa (1964)- Samuelson (1964) productivity-based explanation of the same empirical regularity.
11.B. Purchasing Power Parity
Much of the theory of exchange rates is based on PPP, In this section we discuss PPP as a special case of (2,2)-(2.3). In the next section we then derive a more general theory of the exchange rate that will provide an alternative hypothesis to PPP in our empirical tests, Proof: To derive Proposition 3(a) from (2.3), note that under the assumptions of friction less markets and identical homothetic utility functions, the relative consumption bundles will be identical across countries. That is, at any time t there is but one composite good in the world (with time-varying composition proportional to the aggregate consumption amounts of the individual goods). It follows that at any moment the central planner's opportunity set in the (VZ,VI) plane is bounded by a minus 45-degree line. Thus, if the optimum is an interior one, the MRS in that optimum always equals unity.
The proof of proposition 3(b) immediately follows upon specifying~k(vk(t)) = vk(t) in
(2.5)
To reconcile the if-part of Proposition 3(c) with Proposition 3(b), we need to show that 62 must be equal to unity when preferences are identical and frictions are absent. This can be shown by contradiction. 10Under the assumptions of Proposition 3(c), the central planner's opportunity set is again bounded by a minus 45-degree line. However, with risk neutrality-that is, U(t) = VI(t) + ez vz(t))-the central planner's indifference curves degenerate to straight lines with slope -Oz. This geometry immediately means that, if Oz were different from unity, there would always be a comer solution: one country would never consume anything, which is incompatible with the existence of two countries. To see why the irrelevance of initial wealths for the detetination of exchange rates holds only under the highly stylized assumptions in part (c) of Proposition 3, just note that when r there are transaction costs or when preferences differ across countries, the opportunity set is no 9This ignores possible constants (like @k(vk(t)) = ak Vk(t)); such constants are assumed to be part of ek, See also footnote 5.
10An alternative line of proof is as follows. Assume that there is one (composite) good, no friction, and that @k(vk(t)) = vk(t)]'~where q (#o) is relative risk aversion. It follows easily that the consumption ratio, v2(t)/vl (t), will be constant and equal to (32 1/~. As a result, the ratio of initial wealths, W2(0)/Wl(0), must be t321/'l, too. This then means that 62 equals [W2(0)/Wl(0)]~, which converges towards unity as q approaches zero, longer linear (see Figure 1 ), while the indifference curves become non-linear when there is risk aversion. Either is sufficient to produce an interior solution. Thus, any value of OZthen implies a well-defined sharing rule for consumption and, therefore, corresponds to a specific division of initial wealth. *
We finish this section with two comments on Proposition 3. Our first comment relates to the perhaps puzzling indeterminacy of the central planner's consumption allocation problem in the case discussed in Proposition 3(c). Mathematically, this indeterminacy stems from the result that, under the assumptions in Proposition 3(c), all indifference curves must be minus 45-degree lines and, therefore, parallel to the budget line. To better understand the economics behind this indetetinacy, consider the portfolio decisions in the underlying decentralized economy. While, with identical preferences and perfect markets, consumption decisions are similar across countries, the portfolios held by the (risk-neutral) representative agents will differ unpredictably across countries, This is because, in equilibrium, all assets provide the same expected real return, which then implies that all fully invested portfolios are equally acceptable to a risk-neutral investor.
Because of the indeterminacy of the portfolios chosen in the past, very little can be said about the allocation of consumption across countries at any given point in time. All we know is that the dividends will finance a consumption plan that clears the commodity markets. To reflect this indeterminacy, the central planner's indifference curves U(V1(t),v2(t)) must rank all marketclearing consumption patterns (V1(t), vz(t)) as equally desirable, regardless of the initial wealths.
This means that the slope of the indifference cume, 62, is equal to (minus) unity everywhere.
Second, note that Proposition 3 allows us to clear up some confusion that exists about the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis (UEH) and the Siegel Paradox. Specifically, the Siegel Paradox seems to suggest that no equilibrium can be obtained in a risk-neutral world unless the exchange rate is non-random. 11 To resolve the issue, we note first that risk-neutrality ought to be defined in real terms, not in nominal terms (as the UEH does). Stated differently, the UEH implicitly assumes that inflation is deterministic. But Proposition 3(b) tells us that, if inflation is known, the future spot rate automatically becomes non-random. Thus, under the assumptions of the UEH-risk-neutrality and no inflation risk-the Siegel Paradox does not arise, and there is no problem with obtaining equilibrium.
One implication of Proposition 3 is that, within the logic of standard micro-economics, variations in the real exchange rate are prima facie evidence of risk aversion when, at least, consumption preferences are homothetic. We shall address the implications of non-homothetic preferences in Section IV. Before that, we derive a testable equation for rate in the homothetic/CRR4 case, and present some empirical results. Backus and Smith (1993) , Dumas (1992) , Stulz (1987) , and Sercu et al. the level of the exchange (1995) discuss models of the real exchange rate with one or two goods (whereof at least one good is tradable only at a cost), and constant relative risk aversion. These models are special cases of the general, homotheticutility model (2.2). To see this, we first consider the case where relative risk aversion is constant and not equal to unity; that 1S, we specify (2.2) fOr @k(vk(t)) = Vk(t) I"qk, where~k is the pratt-Arrow measure of relative risk aversion, With this definition of~(vk(t)), we obtain:
II. C Models with Constant Relutive Risk A version
11Denote the forward rate, set at time t for delivery at time t+n, by F(t, t+n), and denote a conditional expectation about the future spot rate by Et(S([+n)), The Siegel paradox is that, when exchange rates are uncertain, the UEH from country 1's point of view is incompatible with the UEH from country 2's point of view: F(t, t+l) = E[(S(t+n)) precludes l~(t, t+l) = E1(l/S(t+n)) unless S(t+n) is non-random.
The last line follows after substituting vk(t) = Mk(t)~k(t). In the log-utility case (q= 1), equation
(1.5) immediately leads to
( 2.7) Assuming two countries and identical relative risk aversions across countries, Sercu et al. (1995) us to use a cointegration framework rather than the less powerful techniques that rely on differencing the data. In the next section we discuss how one can test the alternative exchange rate models (PPP versus CRRA).
11.D Testuble Distinctions between the PPP and CRRA Models of the Exchange Rate
In Sections 11.B and 11.C, both the CRRA and PPP models have been derived as exact relations. In practice, no proponent of PPP would reject that theory just because it does not hold perfectly at all times. Instead, the hypothesis is said to hold "in the long run". Once one admits deviations in the short run, the term "long-run PPP" obviously cannot mean that there are no deviations over long horizons; instead, "long-run PPP" can only mean that the ex ante variance of future deviations increases less than proportionally with the time horizon. Or, more precisely, "long-run PPP" is commonly equated with stationarity of the real exchange rate.
Tests of long-run PPP (in the above sense of the term) include time series analysis of real exchange rates and cointegration tests. The empirical evidence is mixed. AutoCorrelation tests often cannot reject the hypothesis of a non-stationary real exchange rate (see, for instance, Adler and
Lehman (1983)), However, the more powerful augmented Dickey-Fuller test does reveal mean reversion in real exchange rates (Abuaf and Jorion (1991)). Cointegration tests, on the other hand, tend to strongly reject PPP (see, for instance, Ness&n (1994) and the references therein).
In light of our theoretical analysis, we offer the following comments on these tests of PPP.
First, the presence of mean-reversion in the real exchange rate does not allow us to distinguish between the PPP and Cm models because the real exchange rate implied by (2,6)-(2,7) is likely to be stationary, too. To see this, re-cast model (2.6) in real terms:
It is quite likely that the real spending ratio on the right-hand side of (2.8) has finite variance. For instance, when all goods are tradable at a positive but finite cost and consumption preferences are identical across countries, then the relative real spending ratio in (2.8) is clearly bounded.
Differences in spending patterns may lead to deviations from Relative PPP if, within each country, relative prices change over time. However, when productive resources can be redeployed across sectors, one would not expect relative prices to wander off to infinity or zero, within a country.
Thus, relative price effects are not likely to imply martingale-behavior in the exchange rate either.
In light of the probable boundedness of the consumption ratio, stationarity of the real exchange rate is not a good criterion if the purpose is to distinguish between the PPP and CRRA models. Rather, the appropriate question is whether deviations from PPP are correlated with real spending data, with the direction of the correlation being consistent with our prior that~k is positive (and, almost always larger than unity). 1s Alternatively, the question to be answered is whether, after controlling for nominal spending, the nominal exchange rate depreciates when domestic prices rise faster than foreign prices, rather than the inverse (as of question is better addressed in a cointegration analysis rather than investigation of real exchange rates.
PPP predicts). This type a univariate time series
This then brings us to our second comment on empirical tests on PPP. True to their main purpose, standard cointegration tests have focused exclusively on the long-term relation between exchange rates and prices, and have simply taken for granted that no other variables are relevant in the VARs-the first stage of a cointegration analysisar in the short-run dynamics in the final equation, Yet, PPP can also be obtained by setting q k = O in the CRRA model, (2.6); and this 13Following Lucas (1982) , many have tested the CRRA model in the special case of equal q's. From equation (2.5), we see that there is no need to impose this restriction. For example, in a plot of means or standard deviations of log real rates against means or standard deviations of log ratios of real spending ratios, Backus and Smith (1993) find no linear pattern. Such a finding, being consisten[ with differences in q's across countries, is not evidence against the general CRRA model, and a fortiori not against the equilibrium approach to the exchange rate.
The Equilibrium Approach to Exchange Rates pa~e 18 CRRA model predicts a long-run relationship between not just exchange rates and prices but also nominal spendings:
(2.9)
In estimating (2.9) in its general form (without a priori restricting the q's to be zero), both nominal spendings and prices are allowed to play independent roles in the short-term dynamics. Thus, when testing for PPP as a special case of (2.9), the first-pass VARS and the short-tern fluctuations are not the same as in the standard cointegration test of PPP (where spending is not allowed to play any role). We provide evidence, in the next section, that such differences in the modeling do affect the conclusions regarding PPP. As a theory of exchange rates, PPP of course cannot answer the question which variables should enter the short-term model, because PPP is utterly agnostic about what variables explain movements of the real rate within the leeway provided by market imperfections or differences in consumption preferences.
Note that a similar VAR-modeling decision has to be made when the Cm model is to be analyzed. Again, theory has no suggestions about what explains short-tern deviations from the equilibrium because theory derives (2.8)-(2.9) as an exact relation. The pragmatic solution again is to assume that the short-term fluctuations are driven only by the variables entering the long-term cointegration relation. But even within this assumption two approaches are possible. First, one could work with (2,9), which lists five nominal variables; then the assumption is that the nominal prices and spendings are allowed to independently affect the short-run fluctuations of the exchange rate. Alternatively, one could re-cast (2.9) into real terms, as follows:
-nl log~l(t) " -+ n2 log I-Iz(t) -= log 62 l-~2 (2.10)
In estimating the cointegration vector(s) between the real exchange rate and the real spending variables in (2.10), one then assumes that also for the first-pass VARS and the short-run dynamics the real consumption data suffice; that is, unlike in tests of model (2.9) one now constrains the coefficients of logMJ(t) and lognj(t) to be the same (up to the sign) in the long-run cointegration relationship, and likewise in the short-run fluctuations. Again, it is not a priori obvious which way of specifying the VARS and the short-run dynamics is the correct one.
To summarize: univariate tests of stationarity of the red exchange rate do not allow us to distinguish between the PPP and CRRA models of the exchange rate. As to cointegration tests, we can test the following hypotheses: 
III Empirical Tests of the Model with Homothetic Utility and Constant

Rehtive Risk Aversion
In this section, we test the CRRA model (in its log form, equations (2.9)-(2. 10)) using cointegration analysis. 14 The original Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration approach adopts a bivariate framework, while the more recent and more powerful approach developed in Johansen (1991) uses a multivariate framework that allows for the existence of multiple cointegrating vectors and a richer specification of short-run dynamics. We have used the latter approach, and in particular the type of tests described in Johansen and Juselius (1992) , to implement the empirical tests of the PPP and CRRA models.
III. A. Data, Model Setup, and Estimation Procedure
One problem with (2.9)-(2. 10) is that, for many countries, real consumption data are not available in high-frequency form. As the VAR procedure used in cointegration analysis requires a large number of observations, we introduce another restriction: nominal spending is assumed to be cointegrated with the money supply. One case where this is trivially true is the cash-in-advance 14Cointegration analysis was pioneered by Granger(1981) and developed by, among others, Engle and Granger (1987) , Phillips (1990) , Stock and Watson (1988) and more recently by Johansen (1988 Johansen ( ,1991 and Juselius (1990,1992) . A lucid and relatively non-technical exposition of the main ideas can be found in Dickey and Rossana(1994) . world, where a country's nominal spending simply equals the country's money supply. Consumer price indices being available on a monthly basis, the substitution of money supplies for nominal consumption data allows us to use monthly data.
Thus, our main purpose is to test (a) whether there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between nominal exchange rate, price levels and money supplies, and (b) whether such a relationship, if any, is of the form specified in equation (2.9)-(2.10) with acceptable positive values for the risk aversion parameters q 1 and T12.We will contrast this test of the CRRA model against the classical PPP alternative, the special case of (2.9)-(2.10) with zero risk aversions.
We have selected six countries. The US serves as the reference country. Germany (GE), the United Kingdom (UK) and Japan (JP) are chosen so as to represent the most heavily traded currencies. Lastly, we added two smaller European countries, Belgium (BE) and Switzerland (SW), on the basis that they (a) had an exchange rate that moved sufficiently independently from For each data set we first test how many long-run relationships seem to be present. The CRRA(l)-(2) and PPP(l)- (2) hypotheses predict that there should be at least five of these cointegrating vectors; but given the nature of the underlying variables and the degree of interdependence (and possibly policy coordination) among the countries in the sample, the existence of a larger number of cointegration relations is quite likely. To estimate the number of cointegrating relationships we use the maximum-eigenvalue (~m) and the trace statistics. 15
Having established that there are at least five long-run relationships, we then verify the statistical acceptability of the PPP( 1) hypothesis in the first 11-variable data set. This test is first done one country at the time, and then for all countries simultaneously. The country-by-country test is undertaken as follows. In the first 11-series system (the test of Hypothesis PPP( l)), for instance, the hypothesis is that, for Belgium, the coefficients for SBE,nBE and zus are 1,-1, and 1, respectively. To test the acceptability of Hypothesis PPP( 1) for Belgium, we verify whether the 1lx 1 matrix~ppp = [1 0000 -1 0000 1]' is compatible with the data, imposing no restrictions on the remaining cointegrating vectors. Such country-by-country tests are done for each of the other countries. The second test is whether the hypothesis is acceptable for all five countries simultaneously, In this test, five cointegrating vectors are specified to conform to the PPP-15Lmax = -T log(l-~+1 ) and TR = -T~=~+1 log(l-L1), where T is the sample size, p the number of variables, and Li is the i-th ordered eigenvalue. The Lmax statistic tests the hypothesis that there are r (< p-1 ) cointegration relations against the alternative that there are r+ 1 such relations, The trace statistic tests the hypothesis that there are r (c p) cointegration relations against the alternative that there are p such relations. The tests often yield different conclusions. Osterwald-Lenum (1992) provides critical values for p = 11 variables, so that (p-r) can go from O (r= 11) to 11 (1=0). Because these tests are known to have low power, Johansen and Juselius (1992) recommend using 90% critical values rather than the usual 95%. hypothesis, while the remaining vectors are left unrestricted. The test statistic is a likelihood ratio.
Tests of the PPP(2) and CRRA( 1) hypotheses (in the 17-variable system) are analogous:
we test for the presence of a specific cointegrating relation as suggested by (2.9). In a test of a PPP hypothesis as reported above, the choice of coefficients for Sk, pk and pus-[ 1,-1, I]-is dictated by theory. Under the CRRA hypotheses, however, any positive value of qus and q k is permissible. Consequently, the number of theoretically acceptable cointegration vectors is infinitely large. We report the tests for some illustrative values for these parameters, first imposing the restriction one coun~at a time, and then for all five countries simultaneously. For instance, to test the hypothesis for Deutsche Mark we test whether the following vector is acceptable for the preselected values for~GE and qus:
[0, O, 1,0,0,0,0, -(l-IIGE), 0,0, (l-llus), 0,0, -~GE, 0,0, qus] .
111.B. Empirical Results and Tests of Hypotheses
We first verify the presence of unit roots in the log of the time series of S(t), H(t) and M(t). Table   1 , below, presents the results of applying the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-test with a data generating process that allows for both constant and a trend, There is a unit root present in all the data series, except for the Swiss ad US money supply series which maybe stationary (apart from the time trend). Tests for the presence of more than one unit root were also performed but failed to reveal the presence of another unit root in any of the variables included in the system. The To test Hypothesis PPP( 1), we estimate the cointegration relations in a system consisting of five nominal exchange rates and six price levels. This is the usual set-up for tests of bilateral PPP in a multivariate cointegration framework. This test has the advantage of restricting, a priori, the coefficients of log(M1) and log(~i) to sum to unity, and, thus, to steer clear of the multicolinearity between the two series. The disadvantage is that, now, nominal money stocks and price levels are no longer allowed to play an independent role in the short-term dynamics either; that is, the short-run fluctuations in the real exchange rate are assumed to be driven by real money supplies only. 17Mark (1985) , who tests the relationship between interest rates and masginal rates of substitution, also obtains very imprecise estimates of q and cannot reject the hypothesis that q = O. Table 6 provides the results of tests for the number of cointegrating vectors in this 11variable system. The CRRA(2) model says that there should be at least five cointegrating relationships in the real data. In contrast, the PPP(3) hypothesis implies that there should be at most nine. This is because, in the PPP view (as distinct from CRRA) the real rate is not related, in the long run, to real spending variables, which then implies that all cointegrating relationships must be either among the real exchange rates themselves-up to four cointegration relationships-or among the real spending variables -up to five cointegration relationships. The &ax test indicates presence of seven cointegrating vectors while the trace test suggests eight. In the further tests of the CRRA(2) hypothesis we have proceeded on the assumption that there are seven cointegrating relations.
As before, we have tested the acceptability of a large number of specific cointegration vectors corresponding to selected values for the risk aversion parameters. Some representative results are shown in Table 7 . Each of the proposed vectors in Table 7 is now rejected, with the possible eXCeptlOn Of the VeCtOr (~us = 3, 11B E = 2) for the Belgian Franc. To confirm the generality of this negative conclusion we add, in the last panel of Table 7 , a test where we do not specify any numerical values for the parameters~1 and ?lUs; that is, we only wish to test whether there is a cointegrating relationship that involves log(SIH1/TIus ), log(M1/Hi) and log(Mus~us ), and only these variables. This restriction is rejected in all cases except, very marginally, for the Belgian franc.
We summarize our empirical findings as follows. First, nominal money stocks and prices do seem to play separate roles in the short-term dynamics: the data reject all models where only real money supplies are allowed to play a role in the short-run fluctuations or where nominal money is not allowed to play any role in them. Second, when money supplies and prices are allowed to play a separate role in the short-term dynamics, equation (2.9) is acceptable when tested one country at the time, as long as the proposed degree of risk aversion is low or even zero. This finding is consistent with the combined hypothesis that the CRW model holds and that money and price data follow similar time paths. Indeed, the Cm model predicts that the coefficients for the price and money supply variables sum to unity; so when these series behave rather similarly over time, it is difficult to distinguish between the roles of the two variables.
Still, the evidence in favor of the CRRA model is far from conclusive. One possible reason for the less than satisfactory results may be the model's assumptions of homothetic preferences and constant risk aversion. In the following section, we therefore return to the general model (1.5) and see what can be said about (changes in) exchange rates when preferences are not assumed to be homothetic and risk-aversion is not constant. As in, for instance, Barten (19@) or Breeden (1978) , we now apply a Slutsky decomposition of the changes in the marginal indirect utilities. That is, we decompose dA/A into the effect of the curvature of the indirect utility (the degree of relative risk aversion) and the effects of changes in each of the arguments of the indirat utility, As a result, the change in the nominal exchange rate is given by the sum of two terms: one, the international differences in real consumption growth rates weighted by each country's relative risk aversion, and two, the international difference in the 18Equation (4,1) is a first-order approximation. A (second-order) Ito expansion shows that, in a model with continuous time and continuous but stochastic output processes, there will be a drift added to the right hand side of (4,1) that depends on the risk aversions and the (co)variances of the nominal spendings, the marginal inflation rates, and the total inflation rates. marginal inflation rates: 19This definition of relative risk aversion, also adopted by Breeden (1978) , is a 'real' measure of relative risk aversion because, when taking partial derivatives with respect to ink(t), we hold constant the prices, In the one-good case, for instance, this definition is identical to the standard definition, -Ck
Iv. Characterizing Changes in the Exchunge Rate
"f'he marginal weights, [~Ckj/dmk] Pkj, sum to unity by virtue of the budget constraint. We denote the two inflation rates by d?'ck/nk and d~k/~k for consistency with the notation in the previous section, but we do not wish to imply that the integrated counterparts~k and~k always have known closed-for-m solutions. The implications of (4.4) for tests of relative PPP are similar to the inferences made in the singlegood model of Sercu et al. (1995) . An increase in domestic inflation should lead to an appreciation of the home currency (a decrease in S), as long as we control for nominal spending. In light of this, the puzzle in standard regression tests of relative PPP is not why we do not observe exchange rates that are equal, on average, to inflation differences. Rather, given that q is commonly accepted to be larger than unity, the puzzle is why we often observe a positive association between the two at all. The reason may be that, in the standard regression tests of relative PPP, the nominal spending variables are omitted. Given that growth rates of nominal spending are positively correlated with inflation rates, the true (negative) effect, 1 -q, of inflation is to some extent confounded with the positive effect, q, of the omitted spending variable. As a result, the empirical estimates of the regression slope of AlnS on Aln(H l~z) are biased towards unity. As Sercu et al. (1995) argue, this is especially true in low-frequency data and in samples drawn from periods of hyperinflation where the correlation between growth in nominal spending and inflation is likely to be stronger than otherwise. This conclusion also holds if q differs across countries.
Equation (4.2) also provides some insights about regression tests of relative PPP that cannot be obtained from (4.4). One, in the (realistic) case where preferences are non-homothetic, there is an additional omitted variable, marginal inflation, which is imperfectly proxied for by the CPI measure of inflation. Since d~k(t)~k(t) is an imperfect proxy for dZk(t)/nk(t), the coefficient for CPI inflation in a regression of AlnS on AlnH l~k is expected to be closer to zero than in the homothetic case. Two, in the regression (4,4), the coefficients for the true inflation rates and the growths in nominal spending need not be identical across countries because the degree of risk aversion need not be equal across countries.21 Imposing a single coefficient for Aln(M 1) and
21In their regression tests of relative PPP, Apte, Kane, and Sercu (1994) 
V. Conclusion
Much of the literature on exchange rate determination is based on PPP, with PPP being justified on the basis of the consumption opportunity set (fnctionless commodity arbitrage), In contrast, the standard micro-economics paradigm views relative pricesand, hence, also exchange rates-as jointly determined by consumption opportunity sets and preferences. We accordingly characterize the equilibrium exchange rate in a general equilibrium economy with imperfect commodity rejected is when the power of the test is low.
z See the survey article by Frankel and Rose (1994) for the evidence on bubbles in exchange rates. markets. We can avoid strong restrictions on the output processes or on preferences because, for our purpose, there is no need to specify the link between the exchange rate and the underlying exogenous variables. In such a model, the real exchange rate is determined by differences in initial wealths-the currencies of richer countries tend to be overvalued, by PPP standards-and by differences in marginal utilities of total consumption. In the special case of homothetic Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions, the model implies that there is a missing variable in the PPP equation, the ratio of nominal spendings, and that the ceteris paribus effect of higher domestic prices is a drop in the value of foreign cmencies rather than a rise (as predicted by PPP).
In models with non-homothetic, non-CRRA utility functions the exchange rate change depends not only on the standard ("average") inflation differential across countries (as in the PPP model) but also on the inflation differential computed on the basis of marginal consumption weights, growth in real spending, and the possibly time-varying degree of risk aversion in the two countries, Thus, standard regression or cointegration tests of PPP suffer from missing-variables biases and ignore variations in risk aversions across countries and over time.
We also present cointegration test of the equilibrium exchange rate model with constant relative risk aversion and homothetic preferences. The results of empirical testing appear to yield few definitive conclusions; in that sense they seem to accord with an observation of Froot and Rogoff( 1994) : "cointegration approaches have sometimes created as much confusion as clarity on the issue of PPP, " One clear implication, however, is that a long-run equilibrium PPP relation between nominal exchange rates and the relevant price levels does emerge if money stocks are allowed to play a role in the short-run dynamics of the system, next to (and independently o~the price levels. Given that one lets money supplies play this role, the hypothesis of stationary combinations represented by equation (2.9) receives some support for values of risk aversion parameters which are both theoretically and empirically acceptable when tested for one country at the time. A related conclusion is that the structure of equilibrium relations revealed by-or extracted from-a given data set depend crucially upon the specification of the VAR model in levels, in particular which variables are included in and excluded from the system being estimated.
We see two challenges for future research in this area. First, more powerful tests me needed to sort out the roles of nominal spending and prices in the long-run relationship, Second, one needs to find an explanation for the empirical result that nominal money stocks seem to play an independent role in the short-term dynamics. In a model such as ours, only real spending matters. Possible approaches could be fluctuations in the velocity of money, or money-in-the- Key to Fi~re 1, The figure on the left assumes a one-good, two-country economy with endowments Q = (q 1, q2). AS there is but one good. vk equals ck. There is a proportional shipment cost,~. Thus, if the consumption point V = (v1, v2) is above and to the left of Q-that is, when country 1 is importing-the consumption opportunity set has a slope -dvl/dv2 = l/(1+1). Likewise, if the consumption point V = (v1, v2) is below and to the right of Q-that is, when country 1 is exporting-the consumption opportunity set has a slope -dv l/dv2 = 1+1. If t32 < (>) 1, the central planner favors country 1 (2), and equilibria like V (V') with a real exchange rate equal to l/(1+~) < 1 (l+r > 1) become more likely. The figure on the right assumes two goods, no friclions, and different consumption preference functions Uk (Ck 1, Ck2 ) , The international opportunist y set for real spending (v2, VI) is strictly convex. To show this itsuffices to replace, in a Heckscher-Ohlin model, the (linear homogeneous) production functions and the factor endowments, K and L, by the (linear homogeneous) preference functions u~(~) and the total endowments, qj = qlj + q2J respectively. Thus, the bound of the opportunity set is linear (strictly convex) if the consumption preferences are equal (different). The larger 62, the more to the right the optimal consumption point, and the higher the MRS (the real exchange rate for country 2). Table 3 . The table shows the~2-tests, degrees of freedom, and probability values for the PPP hypothesis in the 1l-variable data set without money stocks. There are nine cointegration relations in this data set ( Table 2 ). In the country-by-country tests, the PPP-vector is imposed one country at the time; that is, in each such test the other eight cointegration vectors are left unrestricted.
In the test labeled "all countries simultaneously", five PPP-vectors are imposed simdtaneously and four are left unrestricted. (2) and CRRA( 1) hypotheses in the 17-variable data set (including money stocks). There are sixteen cointegration relations in this data set (Table 4 ). In the country-by-country tests, the PPP-or CRM-vector is imposed one country at the time; that is, in each such test the other fifteen cointegration vectors are left unrestricted. In the test labeled "all countries simultaneously", five vectors are imposed simultaneously and eleven are left unrestricted. (2) 0.01 12.46
(2) 0.00 8,73
(2) 0.01 7.69
(2) 0.02
Key to Table 7 . The table shows the~2-tests, degrees of freedom, and probability values for the CRRA(3) hypothesis in the 1l-variable data set (real exchange rates, real money stocks). We assume there are seven cointegration relations in the data (Table 6 ). In the country-by-country tests, the CRW-vector is imposed one country at the time; that is, in each such test the other six cointe~ation vectors are left unrestricted.
